Russia's State Role in Culture: what does it imply?

Un essai sur le rôle de l'état dans la sphère culturelle russe, écris dans le cadre de mon certificat sur l'Europe de l'Est! Un sujet assez complexe, et surtout, d'actualité, et pas seulement en Russie! La censure nous touche aussi au Québec...

Encore une fois, le but est d'être le plus objectif possible et de relater des faits, non pas de juger!

Introduction

The Constitution of the Russian Federation, written in 1993, “guarantees freedom of thought and speech, of legal search, production and dissemination of information including mass information, and bans censorship.” [i] However, events in the recent past years might tell otherwise, which leads to some questioning as to the extent or the actual application of this article of the Constitution. Whether during the Tsarist regime, or the Soviet one, the state has always been significantly active in the cultural sphere, to ensure that art would reflect positively on the country. Especially during the communism era, art was seen as a mean to enforce the ideological control and praise the socialist accomplishments; therefore, artists had to comply with the regime’s framework, which led to censorship for anything that would disrespect it. After the fall of the Soviet Union, new rules had to be established within a context of reconstruction and reaffirmation of the Russian identity. In this regard, symbolic politics were, and still are, used to promote the country’s glorious past, thus leading to attachment to conservative and traditionalist values, like affiliation with the Orthodox Church. This is particularly used by the president Vladimir Putin and can be seen in his cultural policy, whose objectives are to establish the place of the culture in Russia, the extent to which the state, public and private organisations are implied, and the funds it is given by the government, among other indications. Culture Prime Minister, Vladimir Medinsky, was given the task to implement this cultural policy. In the light of recent scandals, and given his key position, he is widely criticized. The cancellation of the premiere of the Nureyev ballet and of the Tannhauser opera, or the trial of Kirill Serebrennikov, just to name a few, are, in the eye of the population, cases of censorship, based on the conservative values advocated by the state through Medinsky and the cultural policy, although it is officially denied.

Given these events, one can wonder what are the effects of the active role of the state in Russian culture? Maybe in a reminiscence of the Soviet’s clear censorship, but more evidently in an attempt to create with funds and without risks, the hypothesis is that Russian artists today perform in an environment of informal or self-censorship where artistic freedom is undermined. The need for money in creations and the need to correspond to the sate’s cultural view in order to be financed or even just seen, lead to restrictions in the creation processes. Moreover, art that derives from the symbolic politics established to guide Russian society are exposed to strong disagreement from the state, leading to manifestations, arrests, and ultimately censorship as well, to accommodate the cultural policy and its defendants. With the state setting lines of conduct in culture field, it would appear that, while not official, there would actually be an informal ideological censorship.

Going back to acts of censorship under the Soviet regime and the importance of symbolic politics after its fall will give a better understanding of the present situation. A brief description of the cultural policies of the new regime and of Medinsky’s role and actions will shed a light to the events happening on the cultural scene. Analysing these will show the apparent consequences of the active role of the state in the culture.

Ideological control and censorship under the Soviet Union

The patterns of the relationship between the state and the people in Russia today can be traced back to the medieval time. In the East European countries, the model of state-society is one of a concentration of power exerted vertically. Feudalism and the Orthodox Church shaped the role of the state toward the society, giving it an arbitrary power, autocratic and paternalist attitude, and influence and control over all spheres of life, blurring the distinction between public and private aspects[ii]. This tendency of an active control of the state is a legacy of the past that characterized the communist era and is passed down today to some extent.

In parallel, arts have always been a large part of Russian’s culture, as can attest the literature, music or ballets it produced. Art was and is strongly supported by the state, may it be a Tsar, a Party leader or a democratically elected government. But the financial support it enjoyed from the state came with the responsibility of carrying its values. In short, the arts and the state are intertwined. Art needs the money of the state, which it provides albeit that art must in turn promote the state. This strong relationship, again, is at the core of today’s situation.

Censorship was common and straightforward in the Soviet Union. Starting from 1932, it was proclaimed by Staline that art had to reflect Socialist Realist philosophy and style. It created a distorted utopia, as what it depicted was a reflection of the Communist Party propaganda praising the successes of the system, like the industrialization progress, while ignoring the darker sides, like the labour camps[iii]. As art was seen and used by the state to promote and glorify the ideology, artists were bound not to digress from the view of the state, or they risked unenviable consequences. While this led to the emergence of an underground alternative art scene where artists exposed their work in the intimacy of their apartment[iv], it mainly kept people in line. Artists who challenged the regime faced repercussions such as imprisonment or worse[v].

In the area of performing art, it was reportedly difficult to submit a performance, as it was required to go through several inspections by censorship boards in theatres. For example, before a ballet could be presented to the public on stage, the plot, music and choreography were studied, revisited and adjusted during the creation process, and the final product was presented in dress rehearsals attended by various administrators or politicians to make sure that it did not stray from the ideology, which could mean at one point shutting down the entire finished project[vi].

This tedious process was frustrating, as was the lack of overall artistic freedom. Living proofs of this fact are dancers that defected to the West. The Soviet Union presented its gem, classical ballet, by touring to western countries in an effort to show how its artistic qualities reflected the success of socialist ideology[vii]. Famous high-profile dancers, notably Natalia Makarova, Mikhail Baryshnikov, Rudolf Nureyev, Valery Panov or Alexander Godunov, took the occasion to defect and pursue their career in western companies[viii]. The stories around the defection were fascinating to the public, subject to multiple articles and speculations to what was going on behind the Iron Curtain. But what most dancers said showed that they wanted to explore new kinds of work and were craving for the artistic freedom Soviet Union lacked[ix].

It is only in the 1980s that Mikhail Gorbachev, with the perestroika, initiated a decrease in the ideological pressure over cultural institutions, until the complete abolition of state censorship in 1990 with the Law on the Press and other Mass Media[x]. In theory, and especially after the 1993 Russian Constitution was established, there was to be no more ideological control. Visual artists are talking about the 1990s as the best years for the freedom of creation because there was no ideological framework; the Soviet one just fell, and a new one had not been established yet[xi].

Symbolic Politic: reviving Russia’s nationalism

The fall of the Soviet Union, along with economical crisis and political changes, brought disarray and a need to redefine Russia’s identity. To this end, patriotism needed to be fed with a national idea that encompasses traditions and memories of the former Empire’s grandeur, with emotionally charged symbols that would give weight to the political position that arbours them[xii]. The importance given to traditional and conservative values, such as the preservation of the Orthodox faith or the power of national unity throughout history, paved the political direction of the newly retrieved Russia. Symbolic politics promote an interpretation of social reality using symbols, and ensure, with the appropriate resources, that this interpretation is dominant[xiii]. Putin particularly exploited symbolic politics after the annexation of Crimea with a propaganda showing the alien character of the western values and emphasising the strength traditional values give to Russia[xiv].

At the same time, the political actors, heavily relying on the events of the past, are making sure that only the officially approved version of historical events is accepted. In this way, they are ensuring that the pillars on which their ideology is built keep benefitting them, while also being of use to legitimize their actions. Arbitrary state-control and policies instilling a fear of the state are seemingly a continuation of the old ways that is not questioned by the population because of the glorification of the past[xv].

The extent of the conservative trend today in Russia is probably mostly seen in the religious sphere. The Orthodox Church is a strong national symbol to which many Russians associate with, as it played an important role in their history and has thick links with the state[xvi].

Cultural Policies as a frame

Alongside with the reinstating of Russia’s nationalism in the 1990s, an updated frame had to be set in the cultural sphere of the country. The withdrawal of Soviet ideological control and the newly found freedom of expression could not alone support the cultural development. Cultural policies were to regulate the state support. In this regard, a text written by Tatiana Fedorova and Nina Kochelyaeva[xvii] provides a comprehensive overview of the bills and laws that led to or are part of the actual cultural policy of Russia. However too detailed in its complete form for the purpose of this essay, the following outlines the context and the implications of the cultural policy.

In the 1990s, Russian society was changing fast, and laws framing the culture and the state support kept changing and expanding, adding new institutions (concerning theatres, movies, or artists, like the Artists’ Union). In 1993, the goals of the cultural policy (freedom of expression, preserving cultural heritage and state cultural institutions) were regrouped in the Federal Programme for the Development and Preservation of Culture and the Arts. The Act on State Support for Theatre Art in the Russian Federation and the Law on State Support for Cinematography in the Russian Federation are examples of laws that managed state funding.

The Basic Law on Culture determined the funds from the state given to culture. In the 1990s, it was 2% of the federal budget. In 2004, it was changed, and the funding provided by the state are set by the Civil and Budget Codes, which also entails that funds are provided to government established institutions. Depending on the state of the economy each year, the share of the federal budget designated for the cultural fields varies. In addition, grants, scholarships and awards (publicly and privately financed) are distributed.

In 2010, a new Law on Culture in the Russian Federation was in drafting, in order to encompass a wider understanding of culture. The draft was made public in 2014. The Culture of Russia (2012-2018) Federal Target Programme’s objectives that are related to the traditionalist approach include the preservation of the cultural identity and the preservation and promotion of cultural heritage. Putin stated that “the aim of the policy is to create a cultural environment that would be based on our history and traditions”[xviii].

However, new laws, such as the one banning from screenings “films defiling the national culture, posing a threat to national unity and undermining the foundations of the constitutional order”[xix], are showing the length to which the state extends its control in the cultural field to ensure that its values are not threatened.

More and more cases seem to indicate various, sometimes even wrong, interpretations of the cultural policy, and censors artistic freedom in the name of the traditional values promoted.

Vladimir Medinsky, the Culture Prime Minister

Vladimir Medinsky is tasked with the implementation of the cultural policy among other mandates[xx]. He is known for his strong attachment and support of conservative values. He overviews which cultural projects will receive state funding and now closely monitors how it is spent[xxi]. He reportedly said that the state would only nurture the projects that are useful[xxii]. In his views, only the creations that support the cultural policy should be financed. The ones that go against it should be self-produced or privately financed, as he finds it immoral to take the state money to create something that will criticize it[xxiii]. Such sayings arose a lot of critics from the artistic field, and were a justification to those calling out to cultural censorship. It also appears to be an echo to the Soviet-like ideological pressure.

Recent scandals implying censorship

In the cinematographic field, especially since the 2015 law that bans films that are not patriotic, there are several cases where censorship might be implied.

Probably the best known is the trial of the film director and theatre director Kirill Serebrennikov, who is accused of embezzlement regarding state funds for some of his projects. The public, even to the West, openly supports Serebrennikov on the basis that his arrest is purely an act of censorship. His acclaimed work (his most recent movie, Leto received awards[xxiv]) defies the conservative interpretation of the cultural policy and sometimes depicts the flaws of the country. He supports LGBT rights, denounces art censorship, criticize religious extremism and pushes boundaries with productions of modern theatre.[xxv] [xxvi] [xxvii]. His art contains political messages, and in this regard, his arrest can be seen as a political move and a consequence of challenging the views of the state.

The movie Leviathan, directed by Andrei Zvyagintsev was also called out, as it can be interpreted as a critic of life under Putin. The political figures shamelessly bribing to get things their way did not flatter Russia’s bureaucracy[xxviii].

Another well-known case to the Western public is the arrest of members of the Pussy Riot, a punk protest group, after a performance criticizing the Church conservative stances. To the West, it became a symbol of Putin’s censorship, as the performers openly challenged the state, although the government denies any political implication in the case[xxix].

In the east, the Novosibirsk opera house’s director, Boris Mezdrich was fired after a production of the opera Tannhauser stirred up protests from religious extremist that felt insulted. In response there were demonstrations against the dismissal, where the organiser, Natalia Pinus, remarked: “Just as we have the freedom of religious believes, artists should have artistic freedom of speech and creative ideas.”[xxx] This outlines the fact that the state’s support goes only toward what reflects its ideology, in this case, religious values.

Other less high-profile creations were the victims of censorship-looking acts. A children’s book, Flags of the World, telling that Lithuania had fought against Russian dominance, was removed from libraries, as it was deemed anti-patriotic by a Russian politician[xxxi]. An historian working on a project about the Stalin years was arrested[xxxii]. The link between these events and the effort of the state to preserve a specific version of Russian history did not go unnoticed.

To all these events, and to the impression that the state is applying cultural censorship in the name of the cultural policy and the protection of the Russian values it advertises, Medinsky and the Kremlin are categorical in their reaction: there is no censorship, as it is unacceptable and forbidden by the Constitution. However, the Kremlin spokesman explains that “the state has the right to expect appropriate performances financed from budget funds” and that “it should not be interpreted as attempts to impose any type of censorship.”[xxxiii]

On the Novosibirsk case, Medinsky says that Mezdrich was fired not in an attempt of censorship, but as a punishment for insubordination[xxxiv] [xxxv]. There is indeed a principle of loyalty in the vertical hierarchy of power. Medinsky reorganised cultural institutions and appointed loyal people to prestigious positions[xxxvi] [xxxvii]. In turn, they are expected to behave accordingly and follow his ways.

Furthermore, the importance attached to conservative values, namely, the Orthodox faith, appears to encourage religious extremists to report and manifest against art that they find offensive. The Pussy Riot event seem to have triggered a law imposing jail terms if religious believers are offended by actions demonstrating disrespect to society[xxxviii]. Similarly, Putin’s homosexual anti-propaganda law seemed to have weighed in the decision of postponing the premiere of the ballet about Rudolf Nureyev’s life[xxxix]. The famous dancer was known to be gay.

Implications of the active role of the State in the cultural scene

It appears that the state’s cultural policy is favouring those who align with the conservative values the state wishes to promote. By financing cultural creations, the state ensures a control over what is presented to the public, and the cultural policy and its ideology is an excuse to justify why it may not be granted the right to be showcased. The state also indirectly interferes in the cultural field with laws that have an impact on the possibilities of creation. A project that might offense religious people faces serious consequences.

The impact of the active state implication in the cultural field is mostly self-censorship. Artists simply don’t want the trouble of challenging the state and need an access to government funds[xl]. Instead, they try to work within the range of motion they feel they have. They might also display their art privately[xli]. Because of that, the Russian cultural scene’s diversity and edginess might suffer from lacks of creations that could contribute to it. Since there is no official censorship and rules as to what to avoid doing, unlike during the Soviet time, artistic creation can be a tricky process[xlii]. The arbitrariness, echoing the power of the state in medieval times lies on the fact that a creation might or might not generate a complaint[xliii]. Artists can try to rely on what happened with similar projects, to have a better idea of how far they can go[xliv].

Those who are actually brave enough to try creating outside of the vague lines are risking dealing with intimidation, complains, protest, and in more serious cases, arrests[xlv] under various accusations. The problem is that it is hard to determine if this is an actual attempt of censorship from the state, or if it is only an action in line with the cultural policy and the symbolic politics to enforce Russian patriotism. It might even be because of a political alliance between institutions[xlvi], which in this case would not even be supported by an ideology, no matter how criticized.

Another effect, and maybe a solution whose popularity will grow, is the rise of seeking private funding[xlvii] which in theory gives more freedom, providing that no law be broken The new social class benefitting from the fall of communism, oligarchs, can help in this way, as well as private institutions. And there is the fact that bribery can be used to secure the financial aspect of a production.

On an ideological side, the recent events arose a fear that Russia is going back to a Soviet-style censorship, not officially, but with undercover actions like the arrests that will lead to a similar result. Artists are protesting to keep the freedom the Constitution gave them in theory, and to push back the tendencies of the past promoted by symbolic politics. Fortunately, protests sometimes bring good reactions. The ballet Nureyev was finally presented to Russia and other countries, and Kirill Serebrennikov was released.

Conclusion

The Russian state always had an active role in the cultural field. State and art depend on each other. A control was openly exerted during the Soviet time when art had to reflect and promote the socialist ideology. Now, with the symbolic politics defining the new Russian state, art once again has to comply with the conservative and traditional ideology. Vladimir Medinsky endorses the cultural policy established as a framework to the cultural scene. But it appears that this allows control of the state over the art, or a large implication in the least, resulting in scandals when works of art derail from the cultural policy. This is reinforced by laws banning certain directions that productions could take (setting a film in a delicate historical period, for example), granting an even bigger control to the state.

The consequences of this active state control are an informal ideological censorship in the form of self-censorship[xlviii]. State funds are needed in order to create, so art might be altered to access those funds. Some artists decide to take the risks of facing retribution from the state. Private funding is also becoming an option. But the general impression is that artistic freedom is seriously undermined and a Soviet-style censorship might be on the rise. At least now people can protest, which keeps the cultural scene slowly but surely flourishing, despite the obstacles it must overcome.

Although art will always depend on the state, it should be given more freedom in order to authentically reflect the society and create a flourishing culture. As long as the state uses art for promoting means, it will not truly serve the society. The state should truly respect the Constitution. It does so by not officially censoring, but it should also not encourage, allow or tolerate actions that lead to censorship.

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https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2017/02/13/dance-of-steel/

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https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=W6TWF1hdjdQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=political+involvement+in+Russia%27s+ballet&ots=SGpvJpLAXS&sig=_ZPrvU90fULa9kFAszk-adUs7Xo#v=onepage&q=political%20involvement%20in%20Russia's%20ballet&f=false

[viii] ROMENDIK, Dmitriy. Dancing their way to freedom: 4 great Soviet ballet defectors. Russia Beyond, August 2015. https://www.rbth.com/arts/2015/08/11/dancing_their_way_to_freedom_4_great_soviet_ballet_defectors_48425.html

[ix] SNOW, Shauna. Defector Makarova to Dance in U.S.S.R.; Baryshnikov Next? Los Angeles Times, January 1989. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-01-21-ca-977-story.html

[x] FEDOROVA, Tatiana & KOCHELYAEVA, Nina. Country Profile Russian Federation. Compendium, Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, February 2013. https://www.culturalpolicies.net/down/russia_022013.pdf

[xi] ROUSSI, Antoaneta. Russian artists on culture, identity and censorship. BBC News, July 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/in-pictures-44548484

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[xiv] LEZINA, Evgenia. The revival of ideology in Russia. Eurozine, March 2017. https://www.eurozine.com/the-revival-of-ideology/

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[xvii] FEDOROVA, Tatiana & KOCHELYAEVA, Nina. Country Profile Russian Federation. Compendium, Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, February 2013. https://www.culturalpolicies.net/down/russia_022013.pdf

[xviii] KISHKOVSKY, Sophia. Russian culture minister Medinsky in censorship row. The Art Newspaper, August 20^th 2014. http://ec2-79-125-124-178.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com/articles/Russian-culture-minister-Medinsky-in-censorship-row/33431

[xix] ALEXANDER, Susannah. Russia aims to ban films "defiling the national culture". Digital Spy, January 19^th 2015. https://www.digitalspy.com/movies/a622419/russia-aims-to-ban-films-defiling-the-national-culture/

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[xxiii] VANDENKO, Andrey. Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky in TASS special project Top Officials. Russian News Agency. https://tass.com/top-officials/872542

[xxiv] Dissident director Kirill Serebrennikov wins film prize despite house arrest. DW, March 31^st 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/dissident-director-kirill-serebrennikov-wins-film-prize-despite-house-arrest/a-48136907

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[xxvi] Renowned Russian director Serebrennikov freed from house arrest. The Guardian, April 9^th 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/russian-director-kirill-serebrennikov-freed-from-house-arrest

[xxvii] Russian film stars offer support to director in fraud case. The Guardian, January 16^th 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/16/russian-film-stars-support-kirill-serebrennikov-director-fraud

[xxviii] HARTOG, Eva. State vs Art: Russia's 2015 Crackdown on Contemporary Culture. The Moscow Times, December 31^st 2015. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/12/31/state-vs-art-russias-2015-crackdown-on-contemporary-culture-a51322

[xxix] Pussy Riot’s Rise to Fame. Censorship and Government Regulation of Music, WordPress. https://wordpress.clarku.edu/musc210-cgr/pussy-riot-and-the-censorship-of-political-activism-in-russia/pussy-riots-rise-to-fame/

[xxx] ‘Save Our Culture!’ Thousands of Russians protest over Soviet-style censorship in arts. Ukraine Today, April 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2gmjQuQiiQ

[xxxi] ROSENBERG, Alyssa. How censorship works in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Washington Post, February 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2016/02/09/how-censorship-works-in-vladimir-putins-russia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f06e19d697b5

[xxxii] LEZINA, Evgenia. The revival of ideology in Russia. Eurozine, March 2017. https://www.eurozine.com/the-revival-of-ideology/

[xxxiii] Kremlin against censorship in creative arts, but calls for appropriate productions. Russian News Agency, March 2015. https://tass.com/non-political/785839?_ga=2.216590358.1843992161.1564601049-1448506657.1562784133

[xxxiv] VANDENKO, Andrey. Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky in TASS special project Top Officials. Russian News Agency. https://tass.com/top-officials/872542

[xxxv] Kremlin against censorship in creative arts, but calls for appropriate productions. Russian News Agency, March 2015. https://tass.com/non-political/785839?_ga=2.216590358.1843992161.1564601049-1448506657.1562784133

[xxxvi] VANDENKO, Andrey. Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky in TASS special project Top Officials. Russian News Agency. https://tass.com/top-officials/872542

[xxxvii] JONSON, Lena. Russia : Cultural Freedom under Threat. Freemuse Artsfreedom, May 2015. https://freemuse.org/news/russia-cultural-freedom-under-threat-2/

[xxxviii] AFP. Vladimir Putin signs anti-gay propaganda bill. The Telegraph, June 2013. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10151790/Vladimir-Putin-signs-anti-gay-propaganda-bill.html

[xxxix] OLIPHANT, Roland. Bolshoi Ballet denies bowing to censorship over canceled Rudolf Nureyev show. The Telegraph, July 2017. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/10/bolshoi-ballet-denies-bowing-censorship-canceled-rudolf-nureyev/

[xl] ANTONOVA, Natalia. The arts thrive in Putin’s Russia – though they play a complex game of censorship. The Guardian, March 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/30/arts-putin-russia-censorship-kremlin

[xli] ROUSSI, Antoaneta. Russian artists on culture, identity and censorship. BBC News, July 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/in-pictures-44548484

[xlii] ANTONOVA, Natalia. The arts thrive in Putin’s Russia – though they play a complex game of censorship. The Guardian, March 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/30/arts-putin-russia-censorship-kremlin

[xliii] ROSENBERG, Alyssa. How censorship works in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Washington Post, February 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2016/02/09/how-censorship-works-in-vladimir-putins-russia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f06e19d697b5

[xliv] ROSENBERG, Alyssa. How censorship works in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Washington Post, February 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2016/02/09/how-censorship-works-in-vladimir-putins-russia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f06e19d697b5

[xlv] JONSON, Lena. Russia : Cultural Freedom under Threat. Freemuse Artsfreedom, May 2015. https://freemuse.org/news/russia-cultural-freedom-under-threat-2/

[xlvi] ANTONOVA, Natalia. The arts thrive in Putin’s Russia – though they play a complex game of censorship. The Guardian, March 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/30/arts-putin-russia-censorship-kremlin

[xlvii] FEDOROVA, Tatiana & KOCHELYAEVA, Nina. Country Profile Russian Federation. Compendium, Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, February 2013. https://www.culturalpolicies.net/down/russia_022013.pdf

[xlviii] JONSON, Lena. Russia : Cultural Freedom under Threat. Freemuse Artsfreedom, May 2015. https://freemuse.org/news/russia-cultural-freedom-under-threat-2/